







The aim of this paper is to provide an overview for the research that has been done so far 
in signcryption area. The paper also presents the extensions for the signcryption scheme 
and discusses the security in signcryption. The main contribution to this paper represents 
the implementation of the signcryption algorithm with the examples provided. 
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1  Introduction to Cryptography 
 
Cryptography word comes from the two ancient Greek words: “krypto”, which means 
“hidden” and “grafo”, which means “to write”. Cryptography meaning is how to make 
what you write obscure, unintelligible to everyone except whom you want to 
communicate with. It is believed that the oldest known text on which cryptography has 
been applied occurred some 4000 years ago in Egypt. The hieroglyphic inscriptions on a 
tomb were written with a number of unusual symbols to confuse or obscure the meaning 
of the inscriptions. Since the oldest times until the 1970s the cryptography was based on 
symmetric encryption. 
 
The mid-1970s is a reference period for cryptography as two major public advances have 
been done.  
 
First is the algorithm Data Encryption Standard (DES) that has been invented. DES is a 
symmetric block cypher based on a 64 bit block. The user feeds in a 64 block of plain text 
and is returned 64 bits of cyphertext. The same algorithm and key are used to encrypt and 
decrypt operations. The aging DES was officially replaced by the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) in 2001. DES, and its more secure variant, Triple DES, are still used 
today, been incorporated into many national and organizational standards.  
 
The second development, in 1976, was a very significant step in the history of 
cryptography. This was the publication of the paper “New Directions in Cryptography” by 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. It introduced a radically new method of distributing 
cryptographic keys, which went far toward solving one of the fundamental problems of 
cryptography, key distribution, and has become known as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
The article also stimulated the birth of a new class of enciphering algorithms, the 
asymmetric key algorithms. Before that, all useful modern encryption algorithms had 
been symmetric key algorithms, in which the same cryptographic key is used with the 
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underlying algorithm by both the sender and the recipient, who must both keep it secret. 
In contrast, asymmetric key encryption uses a pair of mathematically related keys, each of 
which decrypts the encryption performed using the other. By designating one key of the 
pair as private, and the other as public, no secure channel is needed for key exchange. 
This led to important applications we often hear of today. Since the 1970s, a large number 
and variety of encryption, digital signature, key agreement, and other techniques have 
been developed in the field of public-key cryptography. Digital signatures, PGP, use of 
public certificates, various authentication protocols (for example SSL, SSH) are all in the 
“galaxy” of public key cryptography.  
 
Public key cryptography is used to solve various problems that symmetric key algorithms 
cannot. In particular, it can be used to provide privacy, and nonrepudiation. Privacy is 
usually provided through key distribution, and a symmetric key cipher. This is known as 
hybrid encryption. Nonrepudiation is usually provided through digital signatures, and a 
hash function.  
 
The most widely used cryptographic hash functions are MD4, MD5 (where MD stands for 
Message Digest), and SHA/SHS (Secure Hash Algorithm or Standard). The MD4/5 
algorithms were invented by Ron Rivest and RSA Laboratories. MD5 is an improved 
version of MD4. Both condense a message of any size to a 128-bit digest. SHA/SHS is 
similar to both MD4 and MD5; it produces a 160-bit digest. Wang et al. [WAN05] have 
announced cryptanalysis attacks on SHA, MD4, and MD5. For SHA, the attack is able to 
find two plaintexts that produce the same hash digest in approximately 263 steps, far short 
of the 280 steps that would be expected of a 1 60 bit hash function, and very feasible for a 
moderately well financed attacker [2].  
 
A digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of 
a digital message or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe 
that the message was created by a known sender, and that it was not altered in transit. 
Digital signatures are commonly used for software distribution, financial transactions, and 
in other cases where it is important to detect forgery or tampering. 
 
A digital signature scheme typically consists of three algorithms: 
•  A key generation algorithm that selects a private key uniformly at random from a set 
of possible private keys. The algorithm outputs the private key and a corresponding 
public key. 
•  A signing algorithm that, given a message and a private key, produces a signature. 
•  A signature verifying algorithm that, given a message, public key and a signature, 
either accepts or rejects the message's claim to authenticity. 
 
The Digital Signature Standard is on the base of many current research topics today, like 
signcryption. 
 
2  Signcryption Introduction 
 
In 1997 Yuliang Zheng presented a positive answer to the following question: “is it 
possible to transfer a message of arbitrary length in a secure and authenticated way with an expense less than that required by signature-then-encryption?”. This was for the first 
time, since public-key cryptography has been invented, that the question is addressed in 
literature. He discovered a new cryptographic primitive, called signcryption, which 
simultaneously fulfills both the functions of digital signature and public key encryption in 
a logically single step, and with a cost significantly smaller than that required by 
signature-then-encryption [1]. The proposed cryptographic primitive is more efficient for 
both types of costs involved: computational cost and communication overhead. The 
computational cost represents how much computational effort has to be invested by the 
sender and by the receiver of the message. It is determined by counting the number of 
dominant operations involved. The communication overhead represents the extra bits 
which are appended to a message in case of a digital signature or encryption based on 
public key cryptography. 
 
Encryption and digital signature are two fundamental cryptographic tools that can 
guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. Until signcryption, they have 
been viewed as important but distinct building blocks of various cryptographic systems. 
In public key schemes, a traditional method is to digitally sign a message then followed 
by an encryption, named signature-then-encryption. In many applications, both 
confidentiality and authenticity are needed together. Such applications include secure 
email (S/MIME), secure shell (SSH), and secure web browsing (HTTPS). In order to 
accomplish these two goals, many cryptographic schemes have been created: Schnorr 
signature-then-ElGamal encryption, DSS-then-ElGamal encryption, RSA signature-then-
RSA encryption, Schnorr signature-then-RSA encryption, RSA signature-then-ElGamal 
encryption. 
 
Any signcryption scheme should have the following properties: 
1.  Correctness: Any signcryption scheme should be correctly verifiable. 
2.  Efficiency: The computational costs and communication overheads of a 
signcryption scheme should be smaller than those of the best known signature-then-
encryption schemes with the same provided functionalities. 
3.  Security: A signcryption scheme should simultaneously fulfil the security 
attributes of an encryption scheme and those of a digital signature. Such additional 
properties mainly include: Confidentiality, Unforgeability, Integrity, and Non-repudiation. 
Some signcryption schemes provide further attributes such as Public verifiability and 
Forward secrecy of message confidentiality while the others do not provide them.  
- Confidentiality means that only the intended recipient of a signcrypted message should 
be able to read its contents. 
-  Authenticity, we mean that the recipient of a signcrypted message can verify the 
sender’s identity. It is not possible for an attacker to send a message, claiming to be 
someone else. 
- Non-repudiation means that the sender of a message cannot later deny having sent the 
message. That is, the recipient of a message can prove to a third party that the sender 
indeed sent the message. Signature schemes always provide non-repudiation, since 
anyone can verify a signature using only the sender’s public key. Some signcryption 
scheme can provide non-repudiation and these schemes are called S-verifiable, since the 
verifier uses only the signature scheme S. The first DSAverifiable signcryption scheme 
has been introduced by Shin, Lee, and Shim [5].  
 
- Forward secrecy means that an attacker cannot read signcrypted messages, even with 
access to the sender’s private key. The confidentiality of signcrypted messages is 
protected, even if the sender’s private key is compromised. 
- Past recovery means that the sender is allowed to use his private key to recover the 
original message from the cipher-text. Forward secrecy and past recovery are mutually 
exclusive. 
 
Cryptographic operations for signature and encryption are relatively expensive as they 
typically involve computations on astronomically large numbers and generate additional 
communication overhead. With the "digital signature followed by public key encryption" 
method, the computational and communication overhead for achieving unforgeability and 
confidentiality is the sum of the overhead for digital signature and that for public key 
encryption. 
 
The cost for signcryption is significantly smaller than that required by \signature followed 
by encryption". For typical security parameters for high level security applications (size of 
public moduli =  1536 bits), signcryption costs 58% (50%, respectively) less in 
computation time and 85% (91%, respectively) less in message expansion than does 
signature followed by encryption" based on the discrete logarithm problem (factorization 
problem, respectively). The saving in cost brought to society by this new technology is 
potentially huge, especially in the emerging era of electronic commerce in which the 
assurance of secure and authenticated transactions and communications is a key to its 
success as well as public acceptance. 
 
2.1  Shorten Digital Signature Standard 
 
Zheng first scheme is based on the shortened version of the Digital Signature Standard 
known as SDSS. Shorten Digital Signature Standard parameters are: 
p = a large prime number, public to all 
q = a large prime factor of p-1, public to all 
g = an integer with order q modulo p, in [1,..., p-1], public to all 
hash = a one-way hash function 
x = a random number from [1, …, q-1] 
Xa = Alice’s private key chosen randomly from [1,…, p-1] 
Ya = Alice’s public key =  mod p 
 
The Shortened Digital Signature Standard has two versions: SDSS1 and SDSS2. 
Alice’s signature on a message m is composed of two numbers r and s, where 
r = hash ( mod p, m) 
s = x/(r + Xa) mod q 
in case of SDSS1 and 
r = hash ( mod p, m) 
s = x/(1 + Xa ∙ r) mod q 
in case of SDSS2. 
The signature of a message m will be (r, s). In order to verify the signature it is necessary 
to calculate  ,in case of SDSS1, and 
, in case of SDSS2. 
When k is obtained the last check can be done:  
hash(k, m) = r 
 
The most important characteristic of the presented scheme is that, although  mod p is 
not explicitly contained in the signature (r, s), it can be calculated by the receiver using r, 
s and the other public parameters. 
 
SDSS1 is more efficient than SDSS2 in signature generation, as the second involves an 
extra modulo multiplication [2]. In signcryption algorithm there are used two has 
function, one-way hash function and one-way hash function with key.  Techniques based 
on hashing are heavily used in many applications, information retrieval, geometry 
processing, chemical and medical applications and mostly in cryptography [24]. 
 
2.2  Signcryption Algorithm  
 
A signcryption scheme typically consists of three algorithms:  
•  Key Generation (Gen) - generates a pair of keys  
•  Signcryption (SC) - is a probabilistic algorithm 
•  Unsigncryption (USC) - is a deterministic algorithm. 
Signcryption parameters: 
p = a large prime number, public to all 
q = a large prime factor of p-1, public to all 
g = an integer with order q modulo p, in [1,… , p-1], public to all 
hash = a one-way hash function 
KH = a keyed one-way hash function = KHk(m) = hash(k, m) 
(E, D) = the algorithms which are used for encryption and decryption of a private key 
cipher. 
Alice sends a message to Bob. 
Alice has the pair of keys (Xa, Ya): 
Xa = Alice’s private key, chosen randomly from [1, .., q-1] 
Ya = Alice’s public key =   mod p 
Bob has the pair of keys(Xb, Yb): 
Xb = Bob’s private key, chosen randomly from [1, .., q-1] 
Yb = Bob’s public key =   mod p. 
In order to signcrypt a message m to Bob, Alice has to accomplish the following 
operations: 
1.  Calculate  
 
Split k in k1 and k2 of appropriate length. 
2.  Calculate r = KHk2(m) = hash(h2, m) 
3.  Calculate s = x/(r+Xa) mod q, if SDSS1 is used. 
Calculate s = x/(1+Xa ∙ r) mod q, if SDSS2 is used. 
4.  Calculate c = Ek1(m) = the encryption of the message m with the key k1.  
 
Alice sends to Bob the values (r, s, c). 
In order to unsigncrypt a message from Alice, Bob has to accomplish the following 
operations: 
1.  Calculate k using r, s, g, p, Ya and Xb 
, if is used SDSS1 
, if is used SDSS2 
Split k in k1 and k2 of appropriate length. 
2.  Calculate m using the decryption algorithm 
m = Dk1(c). 
3.  Accept m as a valid message from Alice only if KHk2(m) = r. 
 
Using the two schemes SDSS1 and SDSS2, two signcryption schemes have been created, 
SCS1 and SCS2, respectively. The two signcryption schemes share the same 
communication overhead, (|hash(*)| + |q|). SCS1 involves one less modular multiplication 
in signcryption then SCS2, both have a similar computational cost for unsigncryption [1].  
 




Changing the value for Alice’s private key has an impact only on the Alice’s public key.  
Changing the value for Bob’s private key, his public key will be changed but also the k 
will have a different value.  
Taking fixed values for parameters and different values for the message, the key k 
remains the same. 
When are taken the following fixed parameters: 
 
 and the following values for the massage, then the calculated values for the hash and 
signature are as follows:  
Identity based signcryption scheme is rapidly emerging in recent years and the notions of 
ring signcryption and proxy signcryption have been created. 
 
The introduction of elliptic curve cryptography by Neal Koblitz [15] and Victor Miller 
[16] independently and simultaneously in the mid-1980s has yielded new public-key 
algorithms based on the discrete logarithm  problem. Although mathematically more 
complex, elliptic curves provide smaller key sizes and faster operations for equivalent 
estimated security. Yuliang Zheng also proposed an elliptic curve-based signcryption 
scheme that saves 58% of computational and 40% of communication costs when it is 
compared with the traditional elliptic curve-based signature-then-encryption schemes [3]. 
Zheng original construction is built on a modification of ElGamal signature and carefully 
exploits randomness reuse to authenticate and encrypt the message more efficienty than 
simply encrypting the message using ElGamal encryption. In 2000, [14] Steinfeld and 
Zheng created a scheme which is provably unforgeable assuming the hardness of 
factoring. This algorithm requiresa trasted party to generate system-wide parameters that 
include an RSA modulus of particular shape. 
 
Schnorr's signature scheme, without being further shortened, can be used to construct a 
signcryption scheme which is slightly more advantageous in computation than other 
signcryption schemes from the view point of a message originator. 
There are also many other signcryption schemes that are proposed throughout the years, 
each of them having its own problems and limitations, while they are offering different 
level of security services and computational costs. 
 
2.3 Signcryption Security  
 
A signcryption scheme is secured if it is able to provide both authenticity and privacy of 
communicated data. There are two models of security for signcryption: outsider model 
and insider model. In case of public-key settings, the sender and the receiver do not have 
the same secret key, but each of them has his/her own secret key. In this situation, it is 
necessary for the data protection to be kept safety from an outsider but also from an 
insider, who is a legal user of the system, meaning the sender, the receiver or someone 
who knows the sender’s secret key or the receiver’s secret key. In the strong insider 
security model, the privacy of the signcryption scheme is based on the security of the 
public-key encryption scheme and the integrity protection of the signcryption scheme is 
based on the security of the digital signature scheme.  
 
Non-repudiation should not be part of the definition of signcryption security because it is 
not necessary in all the applications. Although signcryption allows the receiver to be sure 
that the message has been delivered by the sender, it does not necessarily enables a third- 
 
party to verify this because the verification of the authenticity of the message may involve 
the receiver’s secret key, depending on how the signcryption scheme is built [11]. In 2002 
[12] Shin proposed a signcryption scheme that enjoys a secure and efficient non-
repudiation procedure, allowing receivers to convince a third party of the origin of the 
message. In 2005, [13] Malone-Lee suggested a similar technique and proposed a scheme 
extending Schnorr’s signature scheme that was additionally supported by a proof of 
unforgeability. 
 
Regarding the number of the users involved in the signcryption algorithm, there are two 
models of signcryption: two-user model and multi-user model. The two-user model 
contains only the sender and the receiver in this process. In a multi-user network, the 
algorithm works with identities. In the multi-user context, the signcryption scheme needs 
to respect the following rules: 
•  For encryption it is necessary to include the sender’s identity together with the 
encrypted message. 
•  For the digital signature it is necessary to include the receiver’s identity together 
with the signed message.  
 
In the multi-user model the adversary has an extra power, having the ability to access 
flexible signcryption and unsigncryption oracles which allow him to specify the receiver’s 
and sender’s public key, respectively, in addition to the message and signcryptext, 
respectively. In some applications has been implemented the possibility to place 
significant constraints on the public keys in such a way that the Certificate Authority 
ensure that users know the private key associated with their public key. 
Evaluating the two-user security of a signcryption scheme is not sufficient for establishing 
its multi-user security [11]. 
 
2.4 Identity Based Cryptography 
 
The idea of identity-based cryptography has been proposed by Shamir in 1984. The main 
essence of identity-based cryptosystem is to remove the need of certification of the public 
keys that are required in the conventional public key cryptography setting. The public key 
of each participant is obtained from his/her public identity, such as email address, IP 
address combined with a user name, social security number, etc. that can uniquely 
identify the participant. An ID-based cryptosystem is one in which the public key may be 
any string or may be derived from any string. This model requires the existence of a 
trusted authority called Private Key Generator (PKG), whose task is to generate user’s 
private key from their identity information, after a successful identification. The first 
practical identity-based cryptosystem was that of Boneh and Franklin in 2001[7] and 
takes advantage of the properties of suitable bilinear maps (the Weil or Tate pairing) over 
supersingular elliptic curves. The identity-based signcryption scheme with its security 
model has been introduced first by Malone-Lee. Identity-based signcryption is an 
adaptation of identity based encryption to the case of signcryption.  
 
3  Ring Signcryption 
 In Asiacrypt 2001, Rivest, Shamir and Tauman firstly addressed and formalized the 
notion of ring signatures [8]. A ring signature can be considered as a simplified group 
signature with no manager, no group setup procedure, and no revocation mechanism, and 
hence, it provides signer’s ambiguity. In a ring signature scheme, the information of all 
possible signers, i.e. ring members, serves as a part of the ring signature for the signed 
message. A valid ring signature will convince a verifier that the signature is generated by 
one of member in the ring, without revealing any information about which participant is 
the actual signer [9]. 
 
Ring signcryption is an anonymous signcryption which allows a user to anonymously 
signcrypt a message on behalf of a set of users including himself. In an ordinary ring 
signcryption scheme, even if a user of the ring generates a signcryption, he also cannot 
prove that the signcryption is produced by himself. In 2008, Zhang, Yang, Zhu, and 
Zhang solve the problem by introducing an identity-based authenticatable ring 
signcryption scheme (denoted as the ZYZZ scheme). In the ZYZZ scheme, the actual 
signcrypter can prove that the ciphertext is generated by himself, and the others cannot 
authenticate it. In the scheme, a user can anonymously signcrypt a message on behalf of a 
set of users including himself. ID-based ring signcryption is very useful to protect privacy 
and authenticity of a collection of users who are connected through an ad hoc network. 
  
4 Proxy Signcryption  
 
The concept of proxy signature was first presented by Mambo in 1996 [6]. Proxy 
signature schemes are useful for secure communication by computing devices lacking the 
necessary computational power to perform cryptographic computations on an online 
realtime basis. These devices can use a more powerful trusted proxy server to perform 
required cryptographic computations on their behalf while maintaining certain checks and 
balances against misuse or abuse of the trust placed on the proxy agent [4]. Proxy 
signature schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, particularly in 
distributed computing where delegation of rights is quite common, such as e-cash 
systems, mobile agents for electronic commerce, mobile communications, grid 
computing, global distribution networks, and distributed shared object systems. 
 
Many proxy signature schemes have been combined with different encryption methods 
obtaining proxy signcryption schemes which have a significantly smaller cost, both in 
terms of cryptographic computation and bandwidth, than the addition of costs for signing 
and encryption [10]. 
 
The basic idea of ID-Based proxy-signcryption schemes is as follows. The original 
signcrypter sends a specific message with its signature to the proxy signcrypter, who then 
uses this information to construct a proxy private key. With the proxy private key he can 
generate proxy signcryption by employing a specified standard ID-Based signcryption 
scheme. When a proxy signcryption is given, a verifier first computes the proxy public 
key from some public information, and then checks its validity according to the 
corresponding standard ID-Based signcryption verification procedure. 
 
5  Conclusion  
 
A lot of research has already been done in the field of signcryption. The signcryption 
schemes that have been discussed here do not represent the entire list, but instead are 
intended to give an overview of the various research directions which have been explored 
so far. Research along signcryption lines is open-ended. 
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